|
Paper presented in the Hiroshima Peace Institute 2006
* A DIFFERENT
KIND OF WAR - The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq
(September 2006) Highly recommended by the BRussells Tribunal. Click on the picture for more information. |
Option 1: Finance for Survival (1991–95)
Option 2: Needs Assessment and Financial Allocations
Option 4: Distribution Plans and Oil Revenue
Option 6: The Linkage of Economic Sanctions and Disarmament
Option 7: Economic Sanctions Policy
Option 8: Procurement of Humanitarian Supplies
Option 9: The UN Sanctions Committee
Option 10: Import and Export Controls
Option 11: UN Security Council and UN Secretariat Oversight
Option 12: Pre-Sanctions Preparations
Option 13: Integrated UN Sanctions Management
Option 17: Emergency vs. Rehabilitation
Option 18: Sanctions Evaluations
Option 19: Public and Informal Meetings of the UN Security Council
Abstract
Economic sanctions
imposed by the UN Security Council on
The UN Security
Council did not exercise its oversight mandate in a continuous and consistent
manner but was nevertheless fully aware of the state of physical and mental
ill-being of the Iraqi civilian population.
The UN Security
Council had a wide range of options to ameliorate the human condition but
succumbed to a hard-line approach preferred by two of its permanent members.
Some of these options would have led to minor improvements to the welfare of
the Iraqi people, e.g., the introduction of the commercial clause in
oil-for-food programme contracts; the agreement of local purchases for the
sanctions food basket; the introduction of a cash component to underpin the
humanitarian exemption in different sectors.
Other options, if
adopted by the UN Security Council, would have made significant and life saving
differences for the civilian population, e.g., the de-linking of economic
sanctions and the military embargo; the de-bureaucratization of procurement of
humanitarian supplies; the increase of permitted financial resources for the
oil-for-food programme based on needs assessments and a sanctions strategy; a
defined unified management structure involving all UN parties charged with the
implementation of sanctions in Iraq, etc.
Since these and
other more humane options were not
chosen despite the knowledge in the UN Security Council of the ensuing human
catastrophe, an analysis of the UN’s role in the Iraq conflict during the
period of economic sanctions reveals elements of intent and therefore wilful
violation of international humanitarian and other law.
Part
I: Introduction
Throughout
the period of Iraq economic sanctions (1990-2003), UN member states, including
the US and the UK, the UN Security Council, a multitude of other
inter-governmental organisations such as the League of Arab States including
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
the ICRC, the Vatican and religious organisations, the international peace
movement and civic leaders vociferously expressed their concern for the welfare
of the Iraqi people. Everyone with a voice wanted to assure the world that it
was the Government of Iraq that was the target of sanctions and not an innocent
population. This is where global solidarity and rhetorical unity on
How
to deal with the
What
these groups and individuals had in common was a deep sense of justice,
compassion, morality and courage. This can not be said for the political world
of governments including the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the
League of Arab States and the European Union. Divided within, unsure,
short-sighted, ill-informed, unprincipled – any or all of these characterize these
political organisations. This ultimately resulted in their inability to make a
difference in solving the
The
UN Security Council should have been the venue to which all the protagonists
would come together to debate conflict resolution. This was not to be. The UN
Security Council became a tool of bilateral interests. Over the years, the
Council distanced itself more and more from its role as a peace maker. It has
to be said here that the Security Council did at times pause to introduce
measures for the benefit of the Iraqi people. This, however, was usually done
under pressure and as an act of last resort. The Iraqi people were treated as
expendable commodities as the latest version of the ‘Great Game’ unravelled.
The UN Security Council had succumbed to hardliner and self-serving policies of
primarily two of its permanent members. For this the Iraqi people and the
United Nations paid a heavy toll.
Part
II identifies 22 distinct issues of relevance for the human condition in
The
renewed debate about a United Nations that is equipped to handle complex
international crises in adherence to the UN Charter and other international law
has no choice but to carefully take into account what went wrong and why in the
UN Security Council’s and to a lesser extent the UN Secretariat’s handling of
the period of economic sanctions in Iraq.
Part
II: Options of the UN Security Council for the Implementation of the
Humanitarian Exemption for
Iraq
Option
1: Finance for Survival (1991–95)
i) During 1991-95 the UN mounted
so-called Inter-Agency Humanitarian Appeals for donations to provide
humanitarian assistance to
ii) The resulting severe shortfall
of such voluntary donations led to a quick deterioration of conditions of life
in Iraq as evidenced by rising malnutrition, mortality and re-emerging diseases
such as erasmus, kwashiorkor, measles and cholera.
iii) A more humane option would have been to appeal for international voluntary
donations to be supplemented by contributions by member governments to make up
any short falls of the funds needed. This would have been a responsible and
human rights-minded approach on the part of the UN Security Council keeping in
mind that socio-economic conditions were deteriorating because of the
imposition of economic sanctions. Such an approach would have resulted in lower
mortality, particularly among children, less malnourishment and better
epidemiological conditions.
Option
2: Needs Assessment and Financial Allocations
i)
ii) Inadequate allocations with
funding ceilings based on qualitative rather than quantitative needs
assessments followed by open-ended oil production with relief revenue dependent
on oil prices created a weak and, as of phase VII, highly volatile resource
basis. Funding uncertainty combined with constraints such as bureaucratic
procurement, withheld supplies, and the absence of a relief strategy had
serious consequences for the Iraqi population.
iii) A more humane approach would have been based on a careful quantitative
assessment of needs and a provision for regular integrated and holistic updates
with guaranteed finance. This would have ensured that the impact of UN Security
Council sanctions policies on the welfare of the Iraqi people would not have
been punitive and been in accordance with international law.
Option
3: The Oil Ceiling
i) Pressure to increase the
severely inadequate financial resources for the humanitarian exemption mounted
soon after the oil-for-food programme became operational in December 1996. In
1998 permitted oil revenue was doubled yet remained inadequate. In late 1999
there was a special one-time additional allocation for phase VII (2000)
followed by the decision to remove the previously prevailing oil ceiling
altogether. This decision constituted a political ploy since the UN Security
Council was well aware that Iraq’ s oil industry was in a “dangerous and
lamentable” state as the UN Secretary General was told year after year by oil
sector UN review missions who visited Iraq annually. Production figures before
and after the oil ceiling was removed in 1999 document the fact that the
capacity of the oil industry had reached a peak of 2.1 to 2.2 million barrels
per day long before the ceiling was lifted. Output could not increase until a
full rehabilitation of the oil industry would take place. This did not happen
until the 2003 invasion. By removing the oil ceiling, hardliners argued that
since the Iraqi Government consequently faced no more output restrictions, the
authorities could earn as much oil income as was required for meeting the needs
of the people. The Government of Iraq was entirely to be blamed if the people of
ii) The shift from predictable
inadequacy due to output restrictions to alleged adequacy because of
‘unrestricted’ oil production introduced a further element of income
uncertainty. The UN Security Council had changed nothing for the better.
iii) A more humane option would have been to agree to major repairs of
Option
4: Distribution Plans and Oil Revenue
During
the period 1996–2003, there have been 13 phases of six months each and an equal
number of distribution plans. These plans were prepared in
i)
Income uncertainty combined with significant delays in the arrival of
humanitarian supplies and blocked supplies as well as the refusal of the UN
Security Council to make up shortfalls from other sources created untenable
inadequacies for the Iraqi population.
ii)
A more humane option would have been
for the UN Security Council to guarantee funding once it had accepted
distribution plans approved by the UN Secretary General. Voluntary
contributions or loans could have provided the funds needed to make up shortfalls.
This would have protected the civilian population against the worst effects of
inadequacy and prevented death and destitution.
Option
5: Dedicated Budgets
i)
Education was one of the sectors included in the oil-for-food programme from
the very beginning in 1996. It was the sector that received the remnants of
allocations when the distribution plans were negotiated between the Government
of Iraq and the United Nations. Other sectors such as food and health, water,
sanitation and electricity had to be given priority. At the end of the
oil-for-food programme (phases I–XIII) in 2003, the allocation for education
requested by the Government of Iraq and approved by the UN Secretary General
amounted to US$ 2.1 billion or about 5% of the total requested allocation. The
amount ultimately allocated was even lower. Prior to the oil-for-food programme
period, i.e., during the years 1990-96, there was no dedicated allocation of
international funds for education. The UN Security Council showed no concern
for the consequent destruction of the education system. While the plight of the
education sector was raised occasionally by individual members of the UN
Security Council, there was at no time a comprehensive debate of this serious
issue. In fact, individual members , in the forefront the
ii)
Sanctions, lack of resources and low priority given to education by the Government
of Iraq accelerated the deterioration of primary, secondary and tertiary
education in the fifteen governorates under control of the Government in
iii)
A more humane option would have been
for the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat to provide dedicated finance
for the education of Iraqi children, at least at primary and secondary school
levels. A shortage of oil revenue could have been made up by extra-budgetary
support out of international donations or the unfreezing of Iraqi accounts held
abroad. This would have allowed more adequate support for teacher training,
educational aids, curriculum development, maintenance and construction of
schools, etc. and to some extent provided youth with the means to prepare for
life.
Option 6: The Linkage of Economic Sanctions and
Disarmament
i)
One of the fundamentals of the UN Security Council’s
sanctions policy for
ii) This economic
sanctions-disarmament linkage throughout the embargo period had a devastating
impact on civilian life in
iii) A more
humane option would have been to de-link economic sanctions from
disarmament demands by proceeding with UN supervised disarmament and
verification programmes while at the same time providing the UN with
comprehensive border inspection authority for all consignments destined for
Option 7: Economic Sanctions Policy
i)
Parliaments, non-governmental organisations and the UN Secretariat are on
record to repeatedly have reminded the UN Security Council and other policy
makers that no country had ever been subjected to such comprehensive sanctions
as was the case in
ii) The maintenance of such
comprehensive sanctions resulted in permanent disability, death of many and the impoverishment of the
majority of the Iraqi population.
iii) A more
humane option would have been to lessen economic sanctions
incrementally in response to cooperation by the Government of Iraq or
preferably in response to the evolving needs of the Iraqi people.
Option 8: Procurement of
Humanitarian Supplies
i) Procuring goods under the oil-for-food programme
was, at all times, cumbersome. The routine required no less than 23 steps that
the importer - the Government of Iraq - and the supplier in the exporting
country had to implement. Involved were inter
alia trade, defence and foreign ministries, trade boards, the exporting
country’s permanent mission to the UN, Iraq’s mission to the UN, the UN Office of the Iraq Programme in
New York, the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Baghdad, the UN
Sanctions Committee, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM / UNMOVIC), and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the two disarmament units, transport
agencies, Lloyds/Cotecna, the inspection agents at Iraq’s borders, and, of course, Iraq’s Ministry of
Trade and the Iraqi end users. Soon after the oil-for-food programme commenced
in 1996, it became clear that such bureaucratization of procurement would lead
to serious and disabling delays in the arrival of humanitarian supplies. Delays
of 12 or more months were not uncommon. The various phases of the oil-for-food
programme, not surprisingly, over time became more and more disjointed. The
procurement process was a major factor. Evidence of the negative impact mounted
and finally in 1999 resulted in the introduction of a so-called “green list”
which identified goods that could be brought into
ii) The inadequately financed
oil-for-food programme was further weakened by special constraints such as
bureaucratization of the procurement process. A population highly dependent on
timely arrival of limited humanitarian supplies became the victim of a
deliberate international bureaucracy.
iii) A more
humane option would have been to establish a red list approach from
the very beginning of the oil-for-food programme. Consistent with international
humanitarian law, a “no list” approach for food and medicines should have been
an integral part of the regulatory framework. The UN Sanctions Committee should
have furthermore agreed to local purchase of food. This would have allowed the
inclusion in the food basket of fresh fruits, vegetables and meat and reduced
the cost for food as locally purchased food items were significantly cheaper
than imported ones. Such an approach would have freed resources for other
sectors and helped to preserve life and livelihood.
Option 9: The UN Sanctions
Committee
i)
The Iraq Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council or the 661 Committee
named after resolution 661 of
ii)
The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee was a supervisory tool for the UN
Security Council. However, instead of supervising the implementation of Council
policies for
The
issue of a sanctions strategy, networking among UN sanctions units, funding,
streamlining of procurement, reporting on the human condition rather than only
the oil-for-food programme, comprehensive oil production oversight, integrated
audits, all major factors for responsible implementation of multilateral
sanctions were neglected by the UN Sanctions Committee. In retrospect it can be
said that the UN Sanctions Committee was little more than an overseer of a
supply programme informally controlled by the
iii)
A more humane option would have been
for the UN Security Council to empower the Iraq Sanctions Committee with
authority to monitor the operational and managerial soundness of the work of
the UN System. More important than this would have been a continuous review of
the impact of UN policies on the welfare of the Iraqi people with regular
feedback to the Security Council. Such feedback should have included guidance
for the Security Council on needed policy changes in the light of developments
in
Option
10: Import and Export Controls
i)
Under economic sanctions, all imports and exports to and out of
ii)
The UN Security Council was furthermore aware of oil exports to
This
inconsistent handling of import and export controls on the part of the UN
Security Council was used by the
iii)
The inconsistent approach on the part of the UN Security Council and the
resulting alleged uncertainty about
iv)
A more humane option would have been
to enforce strict border controls for all imports and exports, not just those
relating to the humanitarian exemption. An increase in subcontracted inspection
personnel at the border entry points, more UN oil overseers in
Option 11: UN Security Council and UN Secretariat
Oversight
i)
In the course of time, the UN Security Council has become the omnipotent body
in the decision making structure of the institution. There is concern among an
increasing number of UN member countries that the UN Security Council has
usurped authority from the UN General Assembly and the International Court of
Justice. They would like to consider this development as part of the UN reform
debate. It can not be denied that the division of labour between these three
entities has become less and less clear over the years. This has had serious
consequences requiring clarification and transparency of mandate.
As
a result of this reality, the UN Security Council unquestionably had the major
oversight responsibility for developments in
It,
however, is important to point out that both the Council and the Secretariat
failed to carry out their oversight mandates in a consistent and continuous
manner. As stated elsewhere, the Council failed to debate issues of fundamental
consequence for the Iraqi people such as the flow of vital supplies, the use of
oil revenue for compensation, the blocking of supplies and the no-fly zones, to
name only a few major areas which needed to be discussed in the Council. More
importantly these areas needed to be assessed through permanent monitoring and
evaluation. This did not happen. Neither did the Secretariat fulfill its mandate
to watch over the dynamics of the oil-for-food programme or show imagination
and foresight for maximizing the benefits of a severely limited humanitarian
exemption. Local purchase of food and other items, integrated implementation of
the programme in areas under the control of the Government in
ii)
Lack of oversight at various levels of the UN (Security Council, Secretariat,
individual UN departments such as DPA, OIP, OCHA, DPKO, etc.) allowed
disjointed approaches, neglect of an oversight strategy, misleading reporting
and bilateral misuse. This serious default, particularly on the part of the UN
Security Council, lessened the pressure on the Council to understand the full
scope of the consequences of inadequate measures for the welfare of the
civilian population and, therefore, contributed to death and destitution.
iii)
A more humane approach would have
been to implement a clearly formulated sanctions strategy based on a
pre-sanctions human condition profile of
Option 12: Pre-Sanctions Preparations
i)
Comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed on
Sanctions
are meant to hold perpetrators and not innocent groups accountable. The
objectives of UN humanitarian assistance in
ii)
The absence of a pre-sanctions assessment and a quantitative needs assessment
in the early stages of economic sanctions put the humanitarian exemption on a
footing which in its inadequacy had grave consequences for the Iraqi people.
The
strong case which recently has been made for pre-sanctions assessments as
mandatory prerequisites for the imposition of UN sanctions (see “Sanctions
Assessment Handbook” published by the United Nations in October 2004)
underlines the awareness that the Iraq sanctions experience has created for the
importance of such an approach. Had such an approach been adopted in the case
of
iii)
A more humane approach would have
been to base the humanitarian exemption on a careful pre-sanctions assessment
followed by continuously updated evaluations of the evolving conditions of a
society living under economic sanctions.
Option 13: Integrated UN Sanctions Management
i)
Different UN entities had operational responsibility for four distinct elements
of the UN Iraq sanctions programme: The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) – after
2000 renamed the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for disarmament and arms
monitoring; the then UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its rapporteur
for reporting on human rights in Iraq; The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC)
for administering and processing claims against Iraq for having invaded Kuwait
and the UN Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) and the UN Office of the
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI) for negotiating the oil-for-food
programme and overseeing its implementation.
As
the activities within any of these four components impacted on the others, it
follows that systematic and continuous networking for conflict
resolution/containment and protection of an innocent population should have
been of paramount importance and a pre-determined part of UN sanctions
management.
Throughout
the period of sanctions such networking was absent. The Iraqi policy group at
UN Headquarters had no outreach to the four components and was, therefore,
ineffectual in giving direction to the
ii)
The isolationist approaches of the disarmament group, the compensation unit and
the human rights and the humanitarian entities meant that policies were
implemented by individual UN units which fostered developments in
iii)
The more humane option would have
been to ensure integrated approaches among the different UN sanctions groups.
This should have included continuous feedback to the UN Security Council to
assist the Council in fulfilling its oversight mandate and to allow it to
adjust its policies for the protection of the Iraqi people and the adherence to
international law. Such an approach would have reduced mortality, disease and
destitution in
Option 14: Compensation
i)
The UN Security Council, as early as October 1990, passed a resolution
reminding Iraq that under international law it was liable for “loss, damage or
injury” as a result of its invasion into Kuwait (see UN/S/Res.674 of 29 October
1990). By mid-1991, the UN Security Council had identified a compensation
mechanism and a corresponding fund through which parties (individuals, firms
and governments) alleged to have suffered losses as a result of
By
mid-2004 the UN Compensation Commission had processed at total of 2.6 million
(!) claims valued at $ 265 billion of which it had awarded $ 48 billion and
actually paid to claimants $ 18.4 billion. Claims submitted by individuals,
firms and governments were in many cases justifiable, in other cases they were
inflated or fraudulent. Documentation to this effect is available.
ii)
In the absence of an integrated approach on the part of those dealing within
the United Nations with various aspects of sanctions and in view of the
secretive manner of UNCC operations, the large diversion of funds went largely
unnoticed. Up to the March 2003 illegal invasion into
In
the late 1990s, the mortality rate for children under five years of age,
according to UNICEF, had surged from 25/1000 in the 1980s to 100-120/1000
children. The large funds transferred to the UNCC, had they been available for
humanitarian programmes, would not have remedied the health problems facing the
Iraqi population living under sanctions. They would have, however, helped large
numbers to survive and to be healed. The UN Security Council’s agreement to
allocate initially 30% (after 2000 25%) of oil revenue for compensation
payments at a time of immense suffering by the Iraqi people must be considered
as one of the most serious and far-reaching mistakes made by the Council during
the entire period of sanctions.
iii)
A more humane approach would have
been to establish the principle of compensation, yet, freeze all compensation
payments with the exception of claims by guest workers in
Option 15: Commercial Clause
It
is part of international business practice for importers to withhold 5-10% of
the payment for a consignment until the goods have arrived and are found to
meet specifications, quality and quantity of the order. Such a standard
provision was lacking in business transactions with
ii)
The absence of a commercial clause constituted an element of vulnerability for
the entire oil-for-food programme. Full payment for goods yet to be received
has encouraged suppliers to neglect standards. Replacing sub-standard goods
with goods meeting quality standards became cumbersome and further delayed the
arrival of items needed by the civilian population. This unnecessarily
intensified deprivation and suffering.
iii)
A more humane option would have been
to include the commercial clause as a standard feature in all contracts. Given
the inadequate resource situation in the oil-for-food programme, this would
have protected resources and accelerated the supply of vitally required goods.
Option 16: Cash Component
i)
Every year governments prepare their recurrent and development budgets in
anticipation of the costs arising from running their nations and investing in
nation-building. Central banks are the custodians of a country’s liquid assets.
It can not be expected that a country subject to economic sanctions can
maintain a normal budgetary process. UN pronounced economic sanctions should
have, however, anticipated the need of
ii)
The UN Security Council had been well aware of the importance of cash in the
implementation of the oil-for-food programme long before adopting resolution
1284 in December 1999. Iraqi Kurdistan already benefited from such a provision
in the early stages of the humanitarian exemption. The UN agencies had the
authority to hand out cash to local Kurdish contractors, purchase items in the
local market and hire local consultants. The UN Secretariat did monitor these
cash transactions in Iraqi Kurdistan and could have done the same in the areas
under
iii)
A more humane option would have been
to build into the oil-for-food programme in all parts of the country a cash
component from the beginning. UN observers and audits could have verified, as
they did in Iraqi Kurdistan, the appropriate use of these minor amounts of
cash. The availability of cash would have removed one of the impediments in the
humanitarian exemption and helped to preserve life and well-being.
Option 17: Emergency vs. Rehabilitation
i)
Throughout the thirteen years of comprehensive economic sanctions, the UN, both
the Security Council and the Secretariat, referred to the humanitarian
exemption as a ‘temporary measure’ (see for example UN S/Res.986,
It
is difficult to understand why the UN Secretariat, with all its experience in
international development, did not increasingly call for changes in the content
of its
Apart
from minor changes, e.g., agreement in early 2000 to carry out limited training
for workers in the oil sector, the UN did not abandon the emergency nature of
its involvement and considered, for the entire thirteen years, the humanitarian
exemption as a temporary measure. As a result, both the UN and its agencies as
well as the Government of Iraq developed a ‘supply and distribution mentality’
which permeated all actions thereby severely neglecting all longer term needs
of a population.
ii)
The UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat must take the responsibility for
treating the civilian population as if they were living in a refugee camp. The
deliberate inadequacy of financial resources, the deliberate limitation of
sectors included in the oil-for-food programme, the deliberate emergency
approach rather than a transition over time to national rehabilitation
converted Iraqis into a nation of survivors and fixers neglecting planning and
preparation for the future. Life for the civilian population became an issue of
‘to-day’ only.
iii)
A more humane option would have been
to introduce medium and long-term components into UN supported programmes in
those areas which determined the quality of life of the civilian population.
The replacement of the emergency nature of UN operations in
Option 18: Sanctions Evaluations
i) Had the UN Security Council and its
Sanctions Committee in cooperation with the UN Secretariat, exercised their
oversight mandate responsibly, it would not have been difficult to continuously
subject UN sanctions policy to a review. Such a review was of particular
importance in the case of
At
no time did the Security Council or the UN Secretariat consider such a test
since this would have meant the end of the sanctions programme as devised for
The
UN Security Council could have introduced a test of this kind, without
difficulty and gone beyond it to take into account the emerging needs of a
society subjected to long periods of sanctions ( temporary vs. medium and long
term needs – see also option 18).
ii)
The absence of continuous oversight of any kind by the UN Security Council or
the specific evaluation of the impact of its own policies on the welfare of the
Iraqi people has put a severe legal and moral burden on the shoulder of the
Council, not just on the US and UK governments. The UN Secretariat itself could
have devised a sanctions effectiveness test, applied it and made its findings
available to the Security Council with a request for debate. It did not do so
and therefore also shares the burden of failure. Following the publication of
the June 2000 ECOSOC document, there was no attempt to discuss the proposed
sanctions test. The document was simply ignored. The response of the UN Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was timid and without determination
to take the report to belatedly pursue the issue of human rights violations by
the United Nations as a result of economic sanctions. The absence of structured
sanctions analyses played into the hands of the hardliners in the Security
Council as the evidence of the serious shortcomings of Council policy remained
evasive. The UN Secretariat, UN Agencies active in
iii)
A more humane option would have been
for the UN Security Council to ensure that regular sanctions effectiveness
tests were carried out by either the UN Sanctions Committee or the UN
Secretariat in order to identify the impact of international policy on the
human condition in
Option 19: Public and Informal Meetings of the UN Security
Council
i)
The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the UN Security Council specify that
unless the Council decides otherwise meetings shall be public meetings (Rule
48). Governments which were not members of the Security Council would therefore
be able to participate in such meetings, if they wished. Such a provision was
in the spirit of a body created to solve international conflicts peacefully
while it allowed participation of all parties to a conflict to meet. In the
case of
ii)
The UN Charter reminds member states that international disputes should be
settled by peaceful means (article 2/3) and emphasizes that solutions to a
conflict should be sought “by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration and judicial settlement” (article 33/1). The UN Security Council
ignored both the spirit as well as the content of the UN Charter and created a
special modus operandi for the handling of the
iii)
A more humane approach would have
been for the UN Security Council to seek public debate with the Government of
Iraq. That could have been achieved by inviting representatives of the
Government of Iraq to Council meetings at which Iraq was to be discussed and by
providing the UN Secretary General with broad policy guidelines to allow him
and senior Secretariat staff to engage Iraqi officials in Baghdad and New York
in a dialogue on humanitarian and other issues of relevance to the welfare of
the Iraqi people. Such an approach would have avoided much confrontation and
misunderstanding and promoted confidence building measures. These would have
benefited the disarmament process, the oil-for-food programme and ultimately
the people of
Option 20: Outreach to Non-State Parties
i)
Through-out the years of sanctions, non-governmental and inter-governmental
organizations other than the UN played an important role in the
The
UN Security Council could have made continuous use of their knowledge through
cooperation and regular exchanges. It was only from early 2000 onwards that
intermittent consultations were arranged by the Security Council with some of
these organizations, e.g., the ICRC. Many important opportunities to tap their
experience were missed.
In
1999 the Security Council, under pressure of international public opinion and
some member governments, decided to establish a panel to look into humanitarian
issues ( this was one of three panels set up by the Council under the
chairmanship of Amb. Celso Amorim, then
Cooperation
between the UN Secretariat and resident non-UN organizations in
For
a variety of reasons including a perceived political inconvenience on the part
of the UN Security Council, the interaction between the UN and non-UN
institutions was poor. This was to the detriment of the civilian population.
ii)
Non-UN institutions operating in areas under the control of
iii)
A more humane option would have been
for the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat to define a clear policy of
cooperation with non-UN institutions for the delivery of a humanitarian
exemption. The greater flexibility of these institutions could have been used
by the UN to fill gaps in the oil-for-food programme in training, institution-
building, infrastructural rehabilitation at the local level, etc. Small amounts
of extra funding could have been mobilized by the UN Secretariat to intensify
co-financing as an integral part of the humanitarian exemption. Instead, a lack
of determination reduced cooperation to an insignificant number of haphazardly
identified projects in southern and central
Enhanced
and planned cooperation would have meant a more efficient use of scarce
resources and better protection of the civilian population against the impact
of sanctions.